Mid-South Views the Floods of 1912 and 1913  

   
                        By Bobby J. Williams

Since the white man set foot in the Mississippi Valley there have been written accounts
of floods on the Mississippi River. There are reports the river was in flood when
Hernando DeSoto discovered it, but recent research indicates these reports are
inaccurate. Because of the acquisition of the area of the Mississippi Valley under the
terms of the Treaty of Paris of 1783 and the Louisiana Purchase, flooding on the river
became a problem of the United States.

Congress did very little toward actual control of the river until after the
Reconstruction Period. Government support for river improvement was mostly confined to
removing snags from the channel. Many private levees were constructed to protect
plantations along the river. During the Civil War many of the private levees were
destroyed as a war measure. The levees that did exist provided very little protection if
your neighbor refused to construct levees. If satisfactory protection was to be
accomplished, assistance by the national government was necessary.

Confinement of the Mississippi River to its channel was a national problem affecting a
good part of the nation. Thirty-one states comprising the area between the Appalachian
and Rocky mountains are drained by the Mississippi. No individual state along the river
had the resources to accomplish control of the stream; therefore, the national
government, with its vast resources, was the only alternative. Nevertheless, the
national government had always resisted efforts to make control of the Mississippi a
national problem.

The aftermath of the presidential election of 1876 produced the first comprehensive plan
to control the Mississippi River. As part of the Compromise of 1877, the supporters of
Rutherford Hayes agreed to back southern efforts to obtain federal action on improvement
of the river.(1) By an Act of Congress on June 28, 1879, the Mississippi River
Commission was established. The Commission was directed to devise ways and means to
permanently locate and deepen the channel of the Mississippi River. Its other duties
were to protect the banks of the river and prevent destructive floods.(2)

During the first few years of its existence the Commission carried on the work directly.
The Commission acquired personnel, plant, and materials to accomplish its assigned
objectives. However, it became general knowledge by 1882 that the Commission did not
have the resources, nor the manpower, to obtain the desired results.

On August 2, Congress enacted the River and Harbor Act of 1882. Under the provisions of
the act the Mississippi River Commission was relieved of the responsibility of carrying
on the work of improving the Mississippi River directly. Through decisions made by the
Secretary of War, Robert T. Lincoln, the actual work of improving the river was to be
done by the Engineer Branch of the United States Army, under the general supervision of
the Mississippi River Commission.(3) Thus, it became the duty of the Corps of Engineers
to control and fight floods produced by the Mississippi River.

There were many floods between the years 1879 and 1912, but those of 1882 and 1903
appear to be the worst. By 1912 the Corps of Engineers believed they had accomplished
management of the river-if not its complete control. The consecutive floods of 1912 and
1913 proved that the Engineers had a great deal of work to do.

Consecutive flood years on the Mississippi are not commonplace, and were usually very
destructive because much of the damage by the first flood would not be repaired. This
was the case in 1913. A major portion of the levee damage sustained in 1912 had not been
repaired. The crest of the 1912 flood exceeded all prior records at all river gauges
south of Cairo, Illinois, with the single exception of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Maximum
river stage at Cairo was set at 53.94 feet, at the mouth of the White River, 56.35 feet,
and at Carrollton, Louisiana, 21.05 feet.(4)

The flood of 1912 was caused by a combination of high waters from the Ohio, Cumberland,
and Tennessee rivers, and the Mississippi River above Cairo. Below Memphis, the St.
Francis and White rivers added additional waters to the flood. The flood started about
the middle of March, but its destructive potential was not known at the time. There were
two crests of the Mississippi River at Memphis in 1912. The river first reached flood
stage on March 24 and did not fall below it for sixty days. The greatest crest occurred
on April 6, when the stage was 45.3 feet, five feet above the previous high-water mark
in 1907. The second crest of 38.9 feet occurred on May 10.

Such record river stages that were produced by the flood of 1912 were not necessarily
the result of intense precipitation. Flood stage at Memphis was 35 feet (it is now con-
sidered 34 feet). The flood of 1882 caused great damage, but the river was less than 40
feet. Intense damage was sustained because the levees on either side of the river were
very small or there was no levee at all. By 1912 the levees were much higher, producing
higher stages, and confining the river to a predetermined channel. A flood such as that
of 1882 could produce great damages, but such a flood in 1912 would have been of no
concern to the Engineers. There was not necessarily more water coming down the river,
but what was there was confined-at least until a levee broke.

During the 1912 flood the first reported crevasse, a break in a levee, occurred near
Hickman, Kentucky. Within a few hours the flood waters reached the rooftops of
houses.(5) At Caruthersville, Missouri, just below Hickman, the water was up to the top
of the railroad which formed a levee protecting the town. The mayor ordered all the
stores closed and a thousand men joined as an army of flood fighters. On April 6, the
St. Francis levee, which is just across the river from Memphis, suffered two crevasses.
One occurred at St. Clair, nine miles above Memphis and the other at Wyanoke, eight
miles below Memphis. The St. Clair crevasse was caused by water running over the levee
and washing it away from the top. The Wyandoke crevasse was caused by heavy pressure
against the levee until it just collapsed. These two breaks, although causing damages,
offered some relief because the river immediately dropped about one-half foot.(6)
Another break at Wilson, Arkansas, flooded an additional 600 square miles. There were
twelve crevasses in the levees between Cairo and New Orleans with an aggregated total of
12.9 miles in length.(7)

Damages in West Tennessee were extensive. Much of the damage was caused by the
Mississippi River backing up the tributary streams and overflowing the area. However,
there was a break in the Reelfoot Levee District. The Memphis Engineer District assisted
the levee district in trying to prevent the break. This work consisted of raising the
top of the levee with sacks of dirt to prevent it being overtopped by the water. The
water was within one-half foot of the top of the levee and some 350 men were trying to
hold back the flood waters. On the night of April 5, during a very high wind, the waves
undermined the sack topping causing them to fall over into the river. The breach in the
levee widened to about one mile before it quit crumbling into the river. A total of
150,000 sandbags were used in the fight.

Great havoc was caused by the break in the Reelfoot levee. The small villages of
Hathaway, Reelfoot, and Bessie were abandoned to the flood waters by the citizens. So
great was the force of the water that the post office of Hathaway was turned on its
side. All of Lake County's 125 square miles of land were under water except for a strip
six miles by four miles, extending from Tiptonville to the north. No mail was received
at Tiptonville for seven days. Adding to the misery of the inhabitants of Tiptonville
was the short food supply with only a week's supply left in the city.

Suffering and sickness were widespread in the refugee camps. There were about 1,400
refugees at Tiptonville including one Bill Wilson. When the levee broke Wilson made a
break for it trying to outrun the waters, but he could not out-distance the onrushing
water. To escape he took to a tree where he stayed for four days without food until he
was rescued. When he was brought to the refugee camp, he was almost starved for food.
Wilson consumed so much food that he was in worse shape than before he had been taken
from the tree.(8) Another problem was disease, especially among children. An epidemic of
whooping cough broke out in the camp resulting in the death of two children.

In Lauderdale County 250 square miles were under water. After four days of heavy rain,
the oldest inhabitants said the flood was sixty-four inches higher than ever before
known. A stock raiser near Ashport had over 100 head of hogs that were placed on a raft
for protection from the waters. They were frightened by a passing gasoline boat and
jumped overboard and all were drowned.

Relief for the citizens of West Tennessee came from all parts of the state. In addition
to the work accomplished by the Red Cross, many newspapers outside the flooded areas
conducted fund-raising drives for the benefit of the refugees. One such effort was by
The Nashville Banner. Another effort was conducted by the ladies of Trenton, Tennessee.

By the end of April 1912, the people of Memphis thought the worst has passed. The city
engineer of Memphis estimated that damage by the flood amounted to about $1.4 million
within the city.(9) On May 1, the river stage dropped to 35 feet. Then heavy rains over
the upper Mississippi Valley pushed the river up again. While the river was at its
highest point, the Mississippi River Commission came to Memphis on an inspection trip.
The Commission routinely makes two inspection tours of the river each year-one at high
water and one at low water. An indication of the damage is gained by the testimony
before the Commission.

Mr. B. B. Harvey addressed the Commission and stated that he represented about $1.5
million worth of manufacturing interests in south Memphis. When they started
construction of the plants at south Memphis the highest recorded water at Memphis was 36
feet, but since that time, the levees had raised the flood level to 45.3 feet, putting
some of the manufacturing concerns eight feet under water during the flood of 1912. A
representative of the Larking Company of America stated that their plant was closed for
fifteen days by the high water. During that period they had to feed and shelter about 80
families.

The flood of 1912 caused considerable damage in the Bayou Cayoso area. From fourteen to
twenty blocks were covered by the flood waters. The area subject ot the most severe
damage was north of the present-day Cook Convention Center. Between 700 and 1,200 people
were driven from their homes. The water almost reached Poplar Avenue. At Jackson Avenue
the water was four to five feet deep between St. Joseph Hospital and the railroad and
the Wolf River was also flooded. Water was approximately four feet deep at North Second
and Mill Avenue.

A total of 714 houses and more than 25 manufacturing plants were under water during the
height of the flood. A heroic fight of two days and two nights was made to save the
Memphis gas plant, but the force of the water was too great and the levee protecting the
plant gave way. Memphis was without gas until the water receded.

In the Memphis Engineer District, which at that time covered the area from Cairo,
Illinois to near Rosedale, Mississippi, 4,379 square miles of land was inundated. More
than 49,000 feet of levee under the control of the Memphis office was destroyed.
Business losses were more than $5.3 million. Added to these figures was the loss of
business by the railroads. The total estimated damage was more than $6.5 million.(10)
Most of the damage in Memphis was due to water backing up Bayou Gayoso, Lick, and
Cypress Creeks and a part of the Nonconnah Creek. Though the damage in Memphis was
considerable, it was confined to a small area. Most of the city is located on a bluff
that keeps it safe from flood waters. The Corps of Engineers reported that most of
Memphis is well above its 100-year project flood.

Damages cannot always be estimated in terms of dollars and cents. Human misery is
difficult to measure. Among these are crop losses due to late planting, hungry people,
sickness, and even death. At the height of the flood it was reported that at least
twelve people drowned and over forty towns inundated in Mississippi alone. The governor
of the state stated that at least 50,000 people needed food.(11) No accurate death toll
was kept, but it was reported that between 50 and 100 persons drowned or died from
exposure.(12)

Taking care of the refugees from the flooded areas was a major problem. Most of the
funds needed were raised by private contributions. Officials of Memphis set up various
camps to take care of those needing help. The citizens of Memphis raised over $16,000 to
help the more than 19,000 in the camps.

Another major problem was finding men to fight the flood. It appeared that nobody wanted
any part of the cold and wet weather. Many local communities resorted to conscription to
obtain flood fighters. Mayor E. H. Crump of Memphis personally supervised the roundup of
about 200 Negroes along the river front. They were put on a government boat and taken to
Arkansas to work on the levee.(13)

Although very serious business, the flood of 1912 had its lighter moments. During the
height of the flood the residents of New Madrid, Missouri, waded through the watery
streets and went to the polls to vote on prohibition. The city was wet (liquor) but it
voted dry.

There were two conspicuous facts resulting from the flood of 1912. The first was that
the levees withstood the flood with surprising success. Experienced gained during the
flood further emphasized the necessity of an increase in height and strength of the
levees all along the river. The states along the river did not have resources to
undertake such a program. It would take the assistance of the national government, but
the government was reluctant to provide funds for the river that did not improve
navigation of the river.

Fortunately for the citizens of the Mississippi Valley the flood of 1912 caught the
attention of the national political parties. All three of the major political parties in
1912 incorporated planks in their respective platforms recognizing the national
character of flood disasters and committed their candidates to a speedy solution of the
problem. All presidential candidates expressly subscribed to these declarations; and, so
far as pre-election promises and party pledges could be made binding, all politicians
represented in Congress were Committed. The Democratic party platform of 1912 stated
that We hold that the control of the Mississippi River is a national problem. The
preservation of the depth of its water for the purpose of navigation, the building of
levees to maintain the integrity of its channel, and the prevention of overflow of land
and its consequent devastation, resulting in the interruption of Interstate Commerce,
the disorganization of the mail service, and the enormous loss of life and property
imposes obligation which alone can be discharged by the Federal Government.(14)

The Republican party also believed that flood control was a national problem. The
Mississippi River is the Nation's drainage ditch. Its flood waters, gathered from 31
States and the Dominion of Canada, constitute an overpowering force which breaks the
levees and pours its torrents over many million acres of the richest land in the Union,
stopping mails, impeding commerce, and causing great loss of life and property. These
floods are national in scope, and the disasters they produce seriously affect the
general welfare. The States, unaided, can not cope with this giant problem. Hence, we
believe the Federal Government should assume a fair proportion of the burden of its
control, so as to prevent the disasters from recurring floods.(15)

The Progressive party echoed these sentiments. It is a national obligation to develop
our rivers, and especially the Mississippi, without delay, under a comprehensive plan.
Under such a plan the destructive floods of the Mississippi would be controlled and land
sufficient to support millions of people will be reclaimed.(16)

Woodrow Wilson in his address accepting the nomination of the Democratic party stated
that the Federal Government should build and maintain levees for flood protection. It
would take vast sums of money; however, the expenditures were necessary if the people of
the Mississippi Valley were to be provided with sufficient protection. Wilson said that
"such expenditures are not largess on the part of the Government; they are national
investments."(17)

During the election campaign the Interstate Levee Association held a three-day
convention in Memphis. Its major objective was to call attention to the fact that flood
protection was imperative. President Taft said that he supported flood control and that
sooner or later the levee system would have to be nationalized.(18) Former President
Theodore Roosevelt, the nominee of the Progressive party, came to Memphis to speak to
the convention. Again, he voiced support for flood control. He proposed to end the
extensive flood damages by spending whatever was necessary to control the river.(19)
With all of the above declarations one could assume that once the Congress was in
session flood control would be a major topic. That was not the case. Flood control
legislation was pushed aside to make way for the progressive measures of the Wilson
Administration. Thus, nothing much was done to repair the damage by the flood of 1912
when the flood of 1913 visited the Mississippi Valley.


Two separate and distinct floods passed Cairo in 1913, the first was caused by the
waters of the Ohio River, and the second in April, caused by the combined waters of the
Ohio and Mississippi rivers. The first rise culminated in a crest of 48.9 feet at Cairo
on January 28. A second rise crested at Cairo on April 7 at 54.7 feet, exceeding in
height all previous records from Cairo, Illinois, to Helena, Arkansas, and from St.
Joseph, Missouri, to Natchez, Mississippi.(20)

The flood of January was carried through the Mississippi Valley with little trouble,
except where crevasses had occurred during the preceding year and the work of closing
them had not been completed. In the Memphis District the levees did not break in
January, 1913, and consequently, very little damage from the overflow was sustained.

The first crest of 1913 had culminated at Memphis on February 3, with a stage of 40.5
feet. During the latter part of February and the first weeks of March, heavy rains over
the Mississippi and Ohio valleys brought a second rise in the river. At Memphis the
second rise began on March 18, with a stage of 20.7 feet, and in the next eight days
eleven feet of water was added to the gauge reading. Flood stage was reached at Memphis
on March 30, the increase in thirteen days being 14.8 feet.

Realizing that a massive flood was about to progress down the river, the Mississippi
River Commission, on March 26, sent a directive to all levee boards and district
engineers to top the levees for an anticipated stage of 55 feet at Cairo.(21) Major E.
M. Markham, Memphis Engineer District, began at once to raise the levees to a stage of
46 feet on the Memphis gauge. By March 29, Major Markham had 300 teams (levee work at
this time was done by teams of mules and scrapper) at work raising the levees in the
Lower St. Francis Levee District. This levee district included all the Mississippi River
levees in Arkansas. The most critical points were at Luxora, Osceola, Sans Souci, Pecan
Point, and Lamberthville. Governor James Futrell of Arkansas ordered 100 convicts to the
Lower St. Francis Levee District, which included the area in Missouri from the Arkansas
boundary northward.

One of the great difficulties faced by the district engineer was the securing of an
adequate amount of labor to do the work of raising the levees. The district engineer
authorized employment agencies as far away as St. Louis to provide levee workers. At
Columbus, Kentucky, many Negro workers were kept at work at the point of a gun. In the
same city, Rube Marquard, the baseball player, who was in town with his team, kept
several Negroes imprisoned in the local pool hall the entire night, threatening to shoot
the first who attempted to escape.(23) Major Markham said he was very angered by the
fact that in many places the people whose land the levee protects were plowing just back
of the levee while his men were struggling to save both the people and the land from
inundation.(24)

Columbus, Kentucky, was the scene of the first serious trouble with the levees. The
levee protecting this town was about one-half mile long. Laborers had been working for
several days to shore up the levee. On the morning of March 31 the work was abandoned,
realizing any other work would be a waste of time. That afternoon, at 5:00 p.m., the
levee crevassed in several places. The people of the city had been warned that a break
was imminent; therefore, no loss of life was sustained. Within a few hours the city was
covered to a depth of from five to ten feet.(25)

Early on the morning of April 1, a 300-foot section of the levee at Greenfields Landing
gave way. This levee was in the area just across the Mississippi River from Cairo. The
water from the crevasse covered most of Mississippi County in Missouri. Near Birds Point
several members of the Missouri National Guard were making a valiant attempt to save the
levee. Suddenly a section of the levee 200 yards long and ten feet wide fell into the
flood waters. The section of levee began floating down the Mississippi. On the section
of levee were thirty-eight men of the National Guard. The men were rescued, but not
before they had floated a considerable distance down the river. All the men agreed that
the steamboat was a better way of negotiating the Mississippi River.(26)

Many stories of heroism came out of the flood of 1913. The crevasse at West Hickman,
Kentucky on April 4, produced one such episode. The levee in front of the Mengel Box
Company gave way and the rush of water could be heard for nearly a mile. Several men
jumped into the water and attempted to sandbag the break. Each time they tried to place
a sandbag, they were pushed back from the crevasse by the force of the current. The men
finally quit and cut the levee in four other places, allowing the water to come in all
along the line to equalize the pressure on the levee. Residents of the area had moved
out two days before when it became apparent that the levee might give way. In a section
of town near the break, the water was four to fifteen feet deep. Every store in West
Hickman had water half way to the ceilings. Damage to property was estimated at more
than $100,000.(27)

On the morning of April 5, the river at Memphis stood at 42.4 feet on the gauge, almost
four feet below the eventual crest. Along Bayou Gayoso in North Memphis, the situation
was fast approaching the critical point. The levee was inadequate and because of its
construction features, the people had been warned that it might break at any moment. The
levee was constructed in a peculiar manner. At one time, just north of Overton Avenue,
there was a building belonging to the Stewart-Gwynne Cotton Company. The building had
been abandoned, and what remained of one of the brick walls served as the levee. City
officials had re-enforced the old wall, but as a levee, it left something to be desired.

At 8:00 a.m. on the morning of April 5, the levee collapsed. Flood waters began to pour
into the northern part of the city. During the next few days other portions of the levee
gave way creating additional flooding. Twenty city blocks were flooded and more than
1,000 families were driven from their homes. St. Joseph Hospital was surrounded by
water. The Memphis Street Railway had to raise its tracks several feet before streetcars
could go into that section of the city.(28)

Presidents Island received considerable water during the flood of 1913. Most of the area
was farmland, therefore, the loss was mainly in farm products. In 1913 the population of
the island was 1,400. Because of the flood, all of the inhabitants had moved to Memphis
for the duration of the flood. Louis Dennard and a family of ten Negroes narrowly
escaped drowning during the first flood of 1913. On January 26, their home on Presidents
Island was washed away by the river. They held on to the timbers of the destroyed house
and floated to a nearby tree. They were picked up the next morning by a relief boat.
Several of the group were almost frozen by their all-night stay in the cold weather.

When it became apparent that the stages of the river would equal that of 1912, the
United States Engineers, in conjunction with the Lower St. Francis Levee District, began
to raise the levees at critical points. The levee near Wilson, Arkansas had been raised
from one to four feet. It was thought this would carry the water through the district
with little difficulty, but in several places the water came very close to the top of
the levee.

April 10 dawned with heavy black clouds rolling in from the west. Torrential rains fell
and tornadic winds began to blow. For two weeks over 100 levee workers had been laboring
to save the levee near Wilson, Arkansas. When the storm came in from the west, more than
half of the levee workers became frightened and left their jobs, leaving about forty-
five men to save the levee. Strong winds drove the waters over the sandbag topping along
a three-quarter mile section near Golden Lake. All at once about 100 feet of levee
collapsed, and within minutes, a gap of 300 feet, still crumbling at both ends, was
pouring water into Poinsett, Cross, and Crittenden counties.(29) Before the flood waters
returned to the river, the crevasse reached a total length of 2,900 feet.

A controversy arose over the break at Wilson, Arkansas. Major Markham, District
Engineer, accused the officials of the Lower St. Francis Levee District of incompetence.
It was his belief that the levee could have been saved had the Levee Board furnished
additional workers. Local officials struck back with the charge that Major Markham was
unfamiliar with the conditions at the time of the crevasse. They reported that the levee
as waterlogged and it was only a matter of time before the levee would give way to the
pressure of the current. The storm which had frightened the levee workers away had only
speeded up the inevitable.

A crest of 46.1 feet was reached on April 9, 1913, at Memphis, but remained there only
one day. By April 29, the river was below the flood stage. Nevertheless, the flood
waters brought with it great damage to property and flood control works. Damage to the
levees was extensive. On the levees under the control of the Memphis Engineer District,
the aggregated total in crevasses came to almost 20,000 feet. Out of an area of 8,801
square miles of territory subject to overflow, 2,105 square miles, or 24 per cent, was
inundated. Over one-half million dollars was expended by the Memphis office and local
levee districts in fighting the flood.(30)

In terms of human misery the flood in the Lower Mississippi Valley could have been much
worse had it not been for the great effort put forward by the Corps of Engineers and
local levee boards. The same flood, before it left the Ohio Valley, had taken 460 lives.
About the only problem occurring under the jurisdiction of the Memphis office of the
Engineers was the procuring of labor, relief for the flood victims was a local
responsibility.

The railroads played a large part in fighting this flood. Their railroad embankments-on
which the tracks were constructed-served as levees for many towns along the river. One
such town was Caruthersville, Missouri. The main part of town was only a few yards from
the river and the only protection for the town was the railroad embankment. It was the
railroad's responsibility to protect its own property, therefore, protection of the
towns behind the railroads. Most often city officials would help the railroads because
it was in their best interest. Railroads also provided relief for the flood victims in
many ways. Their railroad cars provided homes for many of the refugees. When they could
operate, the railroads carried many flood victims to safety. Besides providing rations
to many flood sufferers, the railroads delivered many government rations. In many cases
railroads delivered flood fights and materials to points of danger.

The City of Memphis did an admirable job of taking care of the refugees. Once it was
evident that the overflow would be extensive, city officials set in motion plans for a
refugee camp, Camp Crump, named in honor of Mayor E. H. Crump, was established early in
the flood. At the height of the flood over a thousand refugees were provided for at the
camp. However, no men capable of working on the levees were allowed to stay at the camp.
Mayor Crump personally supervised the conscription of all able-bodied workers at the
camp and sent them off to work on the levees.(31)

Before the floods of 1912 and 1913 the federal government's attitude toward the
Mississippi River was that navigation was the first order of business. Soon after the
twin disasters of 1912 and 1913, a committee of prominent Memphis citizens began to
press for more and better flood control measures. Two of the more important leaders of
the movement were C.P.J. Mooney, editor of The Commercial Appeal, and A.S. Caldwell.
Together these two men organized the Mississippi River Levee Association. Mr. Mooney and
Mr. Caldwell raised $85,000 by public subscription to finance a campaign for better
flood control. This pioneer levee organization's efforts were rewarded in 1917 when the
federal government made its first direct appropriation for the construction of levees
for flood control purposes. The authorization was for $45 million, to be expended at not
more than $10 million a year. In 1922 the Mississippi River Levee Association went out
of existence, its mission successful. However, it engendered other organizations that
continued to fight for flood control.(32)

The Flood Control Act of 1917 contained two important provisions that relate to flood
control in the Lower Mississippi Valley. First, the construction of levees for the
purpose of flood control was authorized. Second, levee construction was made contingent
upon local interest contributing not less than one-third of the cost of levee
construction. However, the maximum amount of funds for levee construction authorized by
the act was not provided for several years. America's entry into World War I, just a few
days later, prevented full funding of the act. Not until after the great flood of 1927
did large amounts of flood control funds become available.

FOOTNOTES

1. C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913, (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), p. 40.
2. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Annual Report of the Chief
Of Engineers, 1883 (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 2117
3. Ibid.
4. United States Congress, Hearings Before the Committee on Flood Control,
House of Representatives, 70th Congress, 1st Session (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1928), p. 33.
5. The Commercial Appeal (Memphis), April 6, 1912.
6. Ibid., April 7, 1912.
7. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Annual Report of the Chief of
Engineers, 1912 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912), p. 3721.
8. Nashville Banner, April 12, 1912.
9. The Commercial Appeal, April 30, 1912.
10. Mississippi River Commission, Proceedings of the Mississippi River Commission,
1912 (Vicksburg: Mississippi River Commission, 1948), p. 1803.
11. Records Division, File E-1-1.
12. The Commercial Appeal, April 20, 1912.
13. Ibid., April 21, 1912.
14. United States House of Representatives, Floods and Levees of the Mississippi
River, 63 Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), p. 47.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. The Commercial Appeal, August 22, 1912.
19. Ibid., September 27, 1912.
20. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers,
1913 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), p. 3377.
21. Ibid., p. 3515.
22. The Commercial Appeal, March 29, 1913.
23. Ibid., April 2, 1913.
24. Ibid.
25. United States Department of Agriculture (Weather Bureau), The Floods of 1913
In the Rivers of the Ohio and Lower Mississippi Valleys (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1913), p. 90.
26. New York Times, April 3, 1913.
27. The Commercial Appeal, April 5, 1913.
28. United States Department of Agriculture (Weather Bureau), The Floods of 1913
In the Rivers of the Ohio and Lower Mississippi Valleys (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1913), p. 30.
29. New York Times, April 10, 1913.
30. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, 1913
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), p. 3518.
31. The Commercial Appeal, April 8, 1913.
32. Ibid., March 28, 1943.
 

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